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Except perhaps for the decade of the Great Depression, no era
in American history produced a more significant period of social
change and reordering than the 1960's. Central to this cultural
transformation were the demands of college and university stu-
dents that the Constitution find room beneath its protective um-
brella for the expression and recognition of students' rights.' This
vast and often volatile political movement led to an examination,
by all elements of society, of the American involvement in the
Vietnam conflict and to passage in 1971 of the twenty-sixth
amendment to the Constitution.' By the early 1970's the desire by
students to be constitutionally acknowledged spread to the public
school systems of the United States.3
During February and March of 1971 the Columbus, Ohio Pub-
lic School System was rocked by widespread student unrest and
rebellion. On February 26th alone, over seventy-five students were
suspended from Columbus' Central High School.4 Under applica-
ble Ohio law,5 the students received suspensions of up to ten days.
See P. JACOBS & S. LANDAU. THE NEW RADICALS (1971); THE BERKELEY STU-
DENT REVOLT: FACTS AND INTERPRETATIONS (S. LIPSITZ & S. WOLIN EDS. 1965); M.
MEAD. CULTURE AND COMMITMENT: A STUDY OF THE GENERATION GAP (1970); THE
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CAMPUS UNREST (1971).
2 Ratified on June 30, 1971, only three months after passage by Congress, U.S.
CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1 provides: "The right of citizens of the United States, who
are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any state on account of age."
3 See S. BAILEY, DISRUPTION IN URBAN PUBLIC SECONDARY SCHOOLS (1971); K.
FISH. CONFLICT AND DISSENT IN THE HImH SCHOOLS (1970); M. LIBARLE & T. SELIOSON,
THE HIGH SCHOOL REVOLUrIONARIES (1970).
1 Lopez v. Williams, 372 F. Supp. 1279, 1282 (S.D. Ohio 1973). The only evi.
dence submitted as to the number of students suspended was the testimony of
Dwight Lopez. The court repeatedly remarked that the school board was extremely
lax in defending its position that the suspensions were valid exercises of discipline.
5 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3313.66 (1972) provides in pertinent part:
The superintendent of schools ... or the principal of a public school may
suspend a pupil from school for not more than ten days. Such superin-
tendent ... or principal shall within twenty-four hours after the time of
1
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Dwight Lopez and eight other suspended students filed a class
action against the Columbus Board of Education and various ad-
ministrators under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The students asserted that
their right to a public education had been terminated without a
prior hearing, and as such, constituted a violation of the proce-
dural due process guarantees of the fourteenth amendment., The
complaint asked the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio to declare the suspension statute unconstitutional,
enjoin any further suspensions without a hearing, and compel the
school board to expunge all reference to the suspensions from the
students' records. The court granted relief and the administrators
appealed directly to the United States Supreme Court.8 Mr.
Justice White, writing for a majority of five, affirmed,9 finding that
students have constitutionally significant property" and liberty"
interests in a public education and that the due process clause is
broad enough to extend protection to these interests. Henceforth,
absent emergency conditions, public school students may not be
suspended without first being given notification of the charges
against them and an opportunity to defend themselves. 2
Prior to the 1960's, remarkably few cases concerning students'
rights reached the courts. Constitutional litigation in the realm of
public education was discouraged by a judicial belief that atten-
explusion or suspension, notify the parent or guardian of the child, and
the clerk of the board of education in writing of such expulsion or suspen-
sion including the reasons therefor. The pupil or the parent, or guardian,
or custodian of a pupil so expelled may appeal such action to the board
of education. . . and shall be permitted to be heard against such expul-
sion. At the request of the pupil, or his parent, guardian, custodian, or
attorney, the board may hold the hearing in executive session but may
act upon the expulsion only at a public meeting. The board may, by a
majority vote of its full membership reinstate such pupil. No pupil shall
be suspended or expelled from any school beyond the current semester.
' U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1: "No state shall. . . deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law .... "
Lopez v. Williams, 372 F. Supp. 1279 (S.D. Ohio 1973).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970), direct appeals to the Supreme Court
are permitted from decisions of three-judge district courts granting or denying an
interlocutory or permanent injunction in any civil proceeding.
Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729 (1975).
10 See notes 66 and 72 to 81 and accompanying text infra.
See note 71 and accompanying text infra. The district court based its appli-
cation of the fourteenth amendment solely on the finding of a liberty interest in
public education, 372 F. Supp. at 1299.
1 See note 84 and accompanying text infra.
2
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dance at a public school was a state-created privilege, the granting
of which could be conditioned upon the waiver of generally pro-
tected liberties. 13 The theory was that as the Constitution made no
reference to a "right to learn," the states should be left free to
establish and supervise public education. A denial of this privilege
by suspension or expulsion was, therefore, thought not to infringe
upon a right of life, liberty, or property within the boundaries of
the due process clause. Public education was found, almost with-
out exception, to be a sacrosanct area, immune from judicial inter-
vention.14
The first significant challenge to the "immunity" of academic
administrators was the "landmark"' 5 decision of Dixon v. Alabama
State Board of Education." Dixon dealt with the right of students
at a tax-supported public college to engage in a peaceful demon-
"3 The United States Supreme Court accepted this rationale in Board of Trus-
tees v. Waugh, 105 Miss. 627, 633-34, 62 So. 827, 830 (1914), aff'd, 237 U.S. 589
(1915): "The right to attend the educational institutions of the state is not a natural
right. It is a gift of civilization, a benefaction of the law. If a person seeks to become
a beneficiary of this gift, he must submit to such conditions as the law imposes as
a condition precedent to this right." Only eight years later, however, the Court was
to state in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) that:
[The concept of liberty includes] not merely freedom from bodily re-
straint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any
of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry,
to establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to
the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those priveleges
long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men. (Emphasis added).
That the Court had perhaps not meant what it said in Meyer was demonstrated in
Hamilton v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245 (1934), wherein the Waugh
rationale was reinstated as the general review standard.
In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973),
by a 5 to 4 margin, the Court reaffirmed that the Constitution does not provide a
"right to learn." See note 91 and accompanying text infra.
See Buss, Procedural Due Process For School Discipline: Probing the Constitu-
tional Outline, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 545 (1971); Gyory, The Constitutional Rights of
Public School Students, 40 FORD. L. REV. 201 (1971); Seavey, Dismissal of Stu-
dents: "Due Process" 70 HARV. L. REV. 1406 (1957); Wright, The Constitution on
Campus, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1027 (1969); Developments in the Law-Academic
Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1128-56 (1968).
" Cf. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923); State v. Bartels, 191 Iowa 1060, 181 N.W. 508 (1921); Foley v.
Benedict, 122 Tex. 193, 55 S.W.2d 805 (1932).
*s Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. at 737, n.8.
* 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
[Vol. 78
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stration on school property. By reinstating students expelled for
violating an anti-demonstration rule,"7 the court repudiated the
privilege theory. The Dixon court found that students have a
"right to remain at a public institution . . . in which they were
students in good standing,"' 8 because the damge of expulsion is
likely to be great and "education is vital and, indeed, basic to
civilized society."' 9 The Dixon court concluded that, prior to any
removal from college, a student must be afforded at least the mini-
mum due process safeguards required by the fourteenth amend-
ment.
20
Relying on the Dixon rationale throughout the 1960's, courts
generally recognized that college and university students were en-
titled to first amendment protection.2' Hammond v. South Caro-
lina State College held that a university policy requiring prior
administrative approval of all campus demonstrations was an un-
constitutional restraint of freedom of speech and the right to peti-
tion for redress of grievances.22 The regulation challenged in
Hammond had been used to ban student protests over allegedly
discriminatory policies promulgated by the college. In ruling that
the restraint on demonstrations violated the first amendment, the
court also implied that a dismissal from any school, to be constitu-
tionally permissible, would have to be grounded on a more rational
basis than the principle that one who owes his existence to the
state should not be allowed to criticize it." From this and subse-
quent litigation brought about by increased student reaction to the
Vietnam conflict, a general rule emerged that educational discipli-
nary policies were justified only if the institution could show that
'1 The students received no prior notice that they were to be suspended. The
notices of suspension were mailed to the students and contained no indication as
to why the action was taken. Nor at any time were the plaintiffs provided with an
opportunity to appear before the board.
"1 294 F.2d at 157.
1" Id.
20 Id. at 158-59.
21 See, e.g., Dickey v. Alabama State Board of Education, 273 F. Supp. 613
(N.D. Ala. 1967) (school newspaper may criticize state legislature); Buckley v.
Meng, 35 Misc. 2d 467, 230 N.Y.S.2d 924 (Sup. Ct. 1962) (guest speakers need not
comport with the administration's views as to what a worthwhile opinion might be).
2 272 F. Supp. 947 (D.S.C. 1967).
2 See generally, Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Edwards v. South
Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Schenck v.
United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
4
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the policies were "appropriate and necessary to the maintenance
of order and propriety considering the accepted norms of social
behavior in the community" 24 and the announced educational
goals of the school.
21
While Dixon was persuasive in the context of the college cam-
pus, it was generally considered less applicable to pre-college stu-
dents in the public schools. Although a few courts were sympa-
thetic to the demands of secondary school students for constitu-
tional recognition," the majority refrained from interfering with
the decisions of state and local boards of education .2 The logic of
the majority position was at times very strained. By the late 1960's,
the courts had recognized that, even though college students had
volunteered for the state supported privilege of education, they
were entitled to the rudiments of due process prior to a termination
of this privilege. It seems unclear then, why high school and ele-
mentary school students, by and large compelled by statute to
attend," should receive less in the manner of a fundamentally fair
procedure to determine whether or not a violation of school policy
had occurred. This criticism finds support in the Supreme Court's
statement in Brown v. Board of Education,9 that "education is
perhaps the most important function of state and local govern-
ments . . . . [I]t is doubtful that any child may reasonably be
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity to an
education. ' 30
21 Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 57 Cal. Rptr. 463, 472 (Dist. Ct. App.
1967).
Students' challenges to the policy decisions of private institutions have gen.
erally met with defeat. See, e.g., Hoadley v. Allen, 108 Cal. App. 468, 291 P. 601
(Dist. Ct. App. 1930). Contra, Miami Military Institute v. Leff, 129 Misc. 481, 220
N.Y.S. 799 (City Ct. Buff. 1926).
26 See, e.g., Hagopian v. Knowlton, 470 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1970); Vought v. Van
Buren Public Schools, 306 F. Supp. 1388 (E.D. Mich. 1969); Soglin v. Kauffman,
295 F. Supp. 978 (W.D. Wis. 1968).
See, e.g., Murray v. West Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 472 F.2d 438 (6th
Cir. 1973); Black Coalition v. Portland School Dist. No. 1, 484 F.2d 1040 (9th Cir.
1973); Linwood v. Bd. of Educ. 463 F.2d 763 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied 409 U.S.
1027 (1972); Farrell v. Joel, 437 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 1971).
E.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 18-8-1 (1971 Replacement Volume): "Compulsory
school attendance shall begin with the seventh birthday and continue to the six-
teenth birthday." W. VA. CODE ANN. § 18-8-2 (1971 Replacement Volume): "Any
person who. . . shall fail to cause a child or children in his legal or actual charge
to attend school as hereinbefore provided, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor ..
21 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
11 Id. at 493.
[Vol. 78
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The ancient doctrine of in loco parentis has been the chief
obstacle in the students' battle for protection from questionable
educational policies.3 1 In loco parentis essentially means that the
authority of a parent is impliedly delegated to the teacher during
school hours.32 At the core of the doctrine of in loco parentis is
society's belief as to what the first twelve years of education are
supposed to accomplish. It has traditionally been thought that
students in colleges and universities are beyond the stage of memo-
rization and emulation, and upon entering adulthood, have
reached the age of critical analysis and experimentation. Thus, a
more liberal, less regimented climate is thought to be conducive
to independent thinking and the development of theoretical skills.
The public school system, on the other hand, has usually been
viewed as serving the function of transmitting rather than discov-
ering knowledge.33 Since less experimentation is necessary, so is
less freedom for the student.3 4
1' See Schwartz v. Schuker, 298 F. Supp. 238 (E.D.N.Y. 1969); Richardson v.
Braham, 125 Neb. 142, 249 N.W. 557 (1933); McLean Independent School District
v. Andrews, 333 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960); Flory v. Smith, 145 Va. 164,
134 S.E. 360 (1926).
32 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *453:
[The father] may also delegate part of his parental authority during his
life, to the tutor or school master of his child; who is then in loco parentis,
and has such a portion of the power of the parent committed to his
charge, viz. that of restraint and correction, as may be necessary to an-
swer the purpose for which he is employed.
Although Blackstone's definition may be read as permitting the parent to decide
whether or not to place the teacher in loco parentis, most interpretations have
considered the sacrifice of parental authority to the school as mandatory.
West Virginia is one of the few states that has codified in loco parentis. W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 18A-5-1 (1971 Replacement Volume):
The teacher shall stand in the place of the parent or guardian in exercis-
ing authority over the school, and shall have control of all pupils enrolled
in the school from the time they reach the school until they have returned
to their respective homes, except that where transportation of pupils is
provided, the driver in charge of the school bus or other mode or transpor-
tation shall exercise such authority and control over the children while
they are in transit to and from the school.
13Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1050
(1968).
11 Most courts invoking in loco parentis purport to balance the harm the stu-
dent may incur by virtue of the discipline, the interest of the parent in seeing that
his child is fairly dealt with, and the necessity of maintaining an intellectually
stimulating atmosphere within the school. In Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729, 736
(1975), the Court recognized that a suspension could "seriously damage the stu-
6
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A typical judicial use of in loco parentis is found in the leading
case on public school students' fourth amendment rights, People
v. Overton.35 A high school student was suspected by the police of
possession of marijuana. A warrant was issued for his arrest and
three detectives served the warrant on the vice-principal of defen-
dant's school. The vice-principal unlocked Overton's locker with a
master key and the officers found marijuana in a jacket pocket.
Although the warrant was found defective, the New York court
convicted the student of possession of narcotics. The court ration-
alized that not only could the vice-principal legitimately consent
to the search, but that if reasonable suspicion is present to believe
that an offense is being committed on school property, school offi-
cials have a duty to investigate .3 The court, in effect, held that the
Constitution should not bar investigation of suspected illegalities
by conscientious educators.
Even given the fact that parents may constitutionally grant
permission to police to search their children's possessions, 3 if we
dents' standing with their fellow pupils and their teachers as well as interfere with
later opportunities for higher education and employment." Too often, the interest
of the school is considered and the effect of the school upon the student is only
mentioned in passing. See Mawdsley, In Loco Parentis: A Balancing of Interests,
61 ILL. B. J. 638 (1973). Obviously, the primary function of the school is to educate.
And while one student may have a deleterious impact on the education of his
classmates:
suspension is a particularly humiliating punishment, evoking images of
the public penitent of medieval Christendom and colonial Massachu-
setts, the outlaw of the American West, and the ostracised citizen of
classical Athens. Suspension is an officially-sanctioned judgment that a
student be for some period removed beyond the pale.
Sullivan v. Houston Independent School District, 333 F. Supp. 1149, 1172 (S.D.
Tex. 1971). While the language in Sullivan is extreme, it does recognize an often
overlooked interest.
20 N.Y.2d 360, 229 N.E.2d 596, 283 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1967), vacated per curiam,
393 U.S. 85 (1968), aff'd on rehearing, 24 N.Y.2d 522, 249 N.E.2d 366, 301 N.Y.S.2d
479 (1969).
3, 24 N.Y.2d at 526, 249 N.E.2d at 368, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 482.
3 If a parent is in control of premises in which his child resides, the courts
generally agree that the parent may consent to a search of his child's possessions.
See, e.g., United States ex rel. McKenna v. Myers, 232 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. Pa. 1964),
aff'd, 342 F.2d 998, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 857 (1965); State v. Kinderman, 271
Minn. 405, 136 N.W.2d 577 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 909 (1966). Contra, People
v. Flowers, 23 Mich. App. 523, 179 N.W.2d 56 (1970). It has been held, on the other
hand, that a child may not consent to a full search of his parents' house. People v.
Jennings, 142 Cal. App.2d 160, 298 P.2d 56 (1956).
[Vol. 78
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can arguendo assume that students have a right to privacy,3
Overton seems to seriously threaten the fourth amendment's ban
on unreasonable searches and seizures.3 First, since the vice-
principal was acting at the behest of the police, it seem incon-
gruous that he should be considered a private citizen as is man-
dated by in loco parentis.4 0 And second, it is doubtful that should
a parent find his child in possession of drugs he would feel com-
pelled to turn the child over to the police-the standard called for
by Overton.
The theory that the school stands in loco parentis might be
acceptable if the courts were to require that a school professing to
act in the place of a parent act as a wise and intelligent one. The
primary virtue of in loco parentis is that it emphasizes the necess-
ity of the school taking an active role in the rearing of the child.
But too often, the theory has been used to give the school the
authority to act as a parent without also insisting that the school
take on the accompanying responsibilities.'
Although certain writers have declared that in loco parentis is
no longer implemented by the courts in student rights cases,42 this
judgment may be slightly premature. The magic words in loco
parentis need not be used to invoke the theory. The United States
Supreme Court has traditionally employed a hands-off policy
when dealing with the public schools in cases not involving equal
protection questions. 3 But since in loco parentis demands a hands-
", It seems difficult to justify the search on the grounds that the school has a
superior property interest. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (the fourth
amendment protects persons not places). Also, Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523 (1967), would seem to rule out a warrantless search based solely on admin-
istrative convenience.
3 See generally, Buss, The Fourth Amendment and Searches of Students in
Public Schools, 59 IOWA L. REV. 739 (1974); Donoghue, Emerging First and Fourth
Amendment Rights of Students, 1 J. LAW & EDuc. 449 (1972); Frels, Searches and
Seizures in the Public Schools, 11 Hous. L. REV. 876 (1974).
" The fourth amendment is not subject to the exclusionary rule in searches and
seizures conducted by private individuals. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465
(1921).
1, Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1054, 1144-
45 (1968).
11 E.g., Note, Constitutional Rights of High School Students, 23 DRAKE L. REV.
403, 404 (1974).
" The language of Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) is typical of the
Court's review policy: "Judicial interposition in the operation of the public school
system of the Nation raises problems requiring care and restraint . . . .By and
8
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off policy, can it not be said that the Supreme Court condones the
continued application of this much criticized doctrine? Certainly
factors other than in loco parentis are considered by the Court
when dealing with educational issues of a state or local nature. But
each justification for federal judicial hesitancy to deal with these
issues, whether it be that education is traditionally a local func-
tion,44 or that educators are better able to educate than courts, 45
seems to imply deference to in loco parentis.
The Court, however, has been much less inclined to refrain
from entering the fray when it finds conflicts in the public school
system which "directly and sharply implicate basic constitutional
values." 6 These basic values have previously been found only in
cases involving first amendment freedoms. Beginning with West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette47 and most recently
in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District,4" the Supreme Court has recognized that school children
are capable of formulating and expressing spiritual and intellec-
tual beliefs of constitutional significance.
Barnette dealt with a regulation adopted by the State Board
of Education making mandatory a flag salute and a recitation of
the Pledge of Allegiance for all school students, public as well as
private, in West Virginia.49 Failure to perform this daily ritual was
large, public education in our Nation is committed to the control of state and local
authorities." 393 U.S. at 104. Exceptions to the general rule have been more com-
mon when states have sought to regulate the conduct of teachers. See, e.g,, Key-
ishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967)(membership alone in a "subversive"
organization is insufficient as a cause for disqualification for public employment);
Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54 (1967)(requirement that teachers swear that they
were not attempting to overthrow the government is "vague"); Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U.S. 479 (1960)(freedom of association renders impermissible state rule requir-
ing listing of membership in all organizations).
" West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
Karr v. Schmidt, 401 U.S. 1201 (1971).
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968).
7 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
Only three years prior to Barnette, the court had ruled in Minersville School
District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), that the states may "require teaching by
instruction and study of all in our history and in the structure and organization of
our government, including the guaranties of civil liberty which tend to inspire
patriotism and love of country." 310 U.S. at 604. The West Virginia Legislature
incorporated this holding in W. VA. Conym ANN. § 1734 [18-2-91 (1943). On January
9, 1942, the West Virginia Board of Education adopted a resolution strikingly simi-
lar to the Supreme Court's Gobitis holding. Barnette overruled Gobitis.
[Vol. 78
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considered insubordination, with the possibility of criminal penal-
ties being meted out for both the abstaining child and his parents.,
Jehovah's Witnesses refused to comply and, stating that the regu-
lation directly infringed upon their religious beliefs, sought an in-
junction to restrain the continued enforcement of the regulation to
all who objected. The Supreme Court held that compulsion was
not a permissible means of enforcing national unity5' and that:
The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States,
protects the citizen against the State itself and all of its crea-
tures-Boards of Education not excepted. These have, of
course, important, delicate, and highly discretionary functions,
but none that they may not perform within the limits of the Bill
of Rights. That they are educating the young for citizenship is
reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of
the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its
source and teach youth to discount important principles of our
government as mere platitudes. (Emphasis added).52
Barnette was subsequently used to remove compulsory Bible read-
ingl and prayers54 from the public schools.
Tinker presented the Court with the opportunity to state the
limits of freedom of speech within the confines of the public
schools. Students chose to publicize their displeasure with the hos-
tilities in Vietnam by wearing black armbands to school. The stu-
dents were suspended with re-instatement conditioned upon their
agreeing to never repeat the demonstration. The Court recognized
that freedom of speech is not absolute-that when faced with an
imminent danger to a legitimate interest a state may lawfully re-
strict the freedom.5 It also noted that states have comprehensive
authority to establish and enforce disciplinary regulations in the
schools." It asserted, however, that "[s]tudents in school as well
as out of school are 'persons' under our Constitution.""
Tinker adopted a balancing approach, weighing the school's
s W. Va. CODE ANN. § 1847 [18-8-1] (1943) as amended § 18-8-2 (1971 Re-
placement Volume).
' 319 U.S. at 640.
52 Id. at 637.
5 School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
56 Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
393 U.S. at 508, citing Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
' 393 U.S. at 507.
Id. at 511.
10
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duty to maintain reasonable order against the right of the student
to exercise his first amendment freedoms in such a way as not to
interfere with the rights of his teachers and classmates." To consti-
tutionally restrict a student's freedom of expression, the school
must demonstrate that the student's conduct "materially and sub-
stantially interfere[s] with the requirements of appropriate disci-
pline in the operation of the school." 5 Although the language of
Tinker seems imperative for all student rights cases, the lower
courts have tended to limit its application to first amendment
problems.'"
To erase the conflict in the lower courts as to the extent of non-
speech freedoms in the public schools, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to Goss v. Lopez.6 ' Goss is very likely the most significant
decision concerning public education since Brown v. Board of
Education.2 Just how far Goss will be extended is conjectural, but
coupled with its' companion case, Wood v. Strickland,63 Goss could
' Id. at 509.
Id. at 505, 513, citing as the proper rule, Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th
Cir. 1966). The Supreme Court has not chosen to stand on the student's side in all
cases alleging an abridgement of first amendment liberties. The Court has repeat-
edly declined to consider challenges to hair-length policies, Karr v. Schmidt, 460
F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 989 (1972); Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d
1034 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970). It is difficult to distinguish
hair length as a means of protest from the wearing of a black armband. The only
basis for differentiation is, perhaps, that historically people have chosen to demon-
strate their political beliefs through the use of armbands, placards and posters
rather than by altering their physical appearance. A strong argument may be made
that, if anything, hair-length protests should be more protected than other forms
of symbolic speech. See, e.g., Arnold v. Carpenter, 459 F.2d 939 (7th Cir. 1972);
Torvik v. Decorah Community Schools, 453 F.2d 779 (8th Cir. 1972); Richards v,
Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970).
10 Compare, Shanley v. Northeast Independent School Dist., 462 F.2d 960 (5th
Cir. 1972) [and] Hatter v. Los Angeles City High School Dist., 452 F.2d 673 (9th
Cir. 1971) with Stevenson v. Board of Ed. of Wheeler County, Georgia, 426 F.2d
1154 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 957 (1970).
-1 95 S. Ct. 729 (1975). For a comprehensive listing of lower court decisions on
due process as applied in the public schools, see 95 S. Ct. at 737 n.8.
.2 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
'- 95 S. Ct. 992 (1975). Public high school students were expelled from school
for violating a school regulation prohibiting the use of intoxicating beverages at a
school sponsored function. The complaint asked for compensatory and punitive
damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the grounds that the school had denied the
students their constitutional rights to due process under color of state law. The
Court held that, while on the basis of common-law tradition and public policy, a
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totally alter the declaration and enforcement of internal school
policies. In Goss, the Court found that by creating a system of free
public education 4 and compelling students to attend, 5 Ohio had
conferred upon students a constitutionally significant property
right. This property right gives students a "legitimate claim of
entitlement" to enjoy their education without arbitrary interfer-
ence from the state.66
The School Board argued that the students did not present a
legitimate claim since, by virtue of the court's decision in San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,"7 a free public
education is not a "fundamental right." The fundamental right
theory, however, is concerned only with the equal protection clause
and not with the more variable guarantees of due process.8 Thus,
school board member is entitled to a qualified good faith immunity under the Civil
Rights Act, he:
... is not immune from liability for damages under § 1983 if he knew or
reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere
of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the
student affected, or if he took the action with the malicious intention to
cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury to the student.
95 S. Ct. at 1001.
" Orno REv. CODE ANN. § 3313.48 (1972) directs local authorities to provide a
free education to all residents between the ages of six and twenty-one.
" Orno REV. CODE ANN. § 3321.04 (1972) compels attendance at school for a
minimum of thirty-two weeks per year.
:6 95 S. Ct. at 735.
7 411 U.S. 1 (1973). In Rodriguez, parents of students argued that education
bears such a close relationship to the effective exercise of freedom of speech and to
the intelligent utilization of the right to vote, that by implication it must also be a
"fundamental right." A determination of the right as fundamental would have the
effect of forcing states to provide an equal education to all students or demonstrate
a "compelling" reason why they could not do so. The "equality" demanded in
Rodriguez went far beyond that sought in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S.
483 (1954). In effect, the plaintiffs in Rodriguez sought to have the system of
financing public education by property taxation outlawed. As in most states, Texas'
schools are significantly better financed in "rich" neighborhoods than in poor.
Perhaps realizing the consequences of mandating totally equal education in the
states, the Court held that:
[Wle have never presumed to possess either the ability or the authority
to guarantee to the citizenry the most effective speech or the most
informed electoral choice. . . . These are indeed goals to be pursued by
a people whose thoughts and beliefs are freed from governmental interfer-
ence. But they are not values to be implemented by judicial intrusion into
otherwise legitimate state activities.
411 U.S. at 36.
" Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
12
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 78, Iss. 2 [1976], Art. 4
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol78/iss2/4
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
while states supposedly need not educate their citizens, if they
exercise their discretion to do so, they must obey the Constitution.
The possibility that a grant from the states may be conditioned
upon the relinquishment of a basic freedom has consistently been
ruled constitutionally impermissible."
The Court also recognized that a peremptory suspension could
have major repercussions later in the student's life." Since all
school boards maintain comprehensive records of students during
their academic careers, and these records are often open for public
perusal, chances for higher education or employment could be seri-
ously diminished if the suspensions were to come to light. Hence,
the student's reputation, protected by the liberty aspect of the due
process clause, demands that suspensions be based upon more
than a unilateral determination of guilt.7 '
The School Board argued that even if students could claim a
right to an education, the ten day suspensions did not constitute
a "severe detriment or grievous loss" necessary to trigger the appli-
cation of due process standards.72 The Court had previously found,
though, that to determine whether due process is applicable "we
must look not to the 'weight' but to the nature of the interest at
stake. 7 3 Therefore, as long as the property deprivation is not de
" Mr. Justice Holmes once remarked that while "the petitioner may have a
constitutional right to talk politics . . .he has no constitutional right to be a
policeman." McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517,
517 (1892). For the current and more libertarian view that privileges cannot be
conditioned upon waivers of constitutional rights, see, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U.S. 479 (1960); Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 593-
94 (1926). See Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Con-
stitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1439 (1968).
'1 95 S. Ct. at 736.
7, Id., wherein the Court, citing in part Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S.
433, 437 (1971), stated "'Where a person's good name, reputation, honor or integ-
rity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him,' the minimal
requirements of the [due process] clause must be satisfied."
72 Confusion reigns as to what complainants must allege to justify due process
standards. Certain cases, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); Joint Anti-
Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951), have stated that a severe
or grievous loss must be shown. Other cases, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67
(1972); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969), have said that the
property deprivation must only be greater than de minimus to call for due process.
Mr. Justice Powell noted the irregularity of the application of the two standards in
his dissent. 95 S. Ct. at 743.
13 95 S. Ct. at 737, citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972).
[Vol. 78
13
Koch: Constitutional Law--The Children's Crusade for Constitutional Rec
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1976
STUDENT NOTES
minimus, its gravity is irrelevant in determining whether the stan-
dards of due process apply. Noting that a suspension "is a serious
event in the life of the suspended student, '74 the Court ruled that
due process must be afforded the student whenever a suspension
is to be given for more than a trivial period.1
5
Mr. Justice Powell dissented, finding that the students had
shown no material decline in their academic achievement as a
result of the suspensions, and that a ten day suspension amounting
to less than 5% of the school year hardly involved the possibility
of serious damage.76 Powell also criticized the majority's "misread-
ing" of previous cases upon which Goss was based. In defining
property interests, the Supreme Court looks first to state statutes
or rules entitling the citizen to certain benefits. 7 If the aggrieved
party can point to a statute conferring upon him a grant from the
state to which he is entitled, the Court has consistently held that
this benefit may not be revoked without the rudiments of due
process2 Thus, while a non-tenured university professor may not
be entitled to a hearing when dismissed,"9 a public school student,
by virtue of a state requiring his presence in school, must be af-
forded the procedural protections of the fourteenth amendment.
However, in the past the Court has also stated that the dimensions
of any property interest are defined by the creating statute." Pow-
ell would thus have ruled that, as the benefit of the education was
qualified by the power to suspend, the students could not complain
if the school actively enforced a statute upon which the property
interest was conditioned.'
The Court stopped short of mandating a full-dress trial to
accompany all suspensions.82 Recognizing that a public school is
"1 95 S. Ct. at 737.
71 Id. The Court ruled only on suspensions of up to ten days. Just how long a
suspension must be to pass the stage of trivial was not discussed. Mr. Justice
Powell, in dissent, noted that even a suspension for one day might not be termed
trivial by the Court's ruling. 95 S. Ct. at 744.
, 95 S. Ct. at 743.
" Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
' E.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (cancellation of prisoner's
good-time credits accumulated under state law); Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471
(1972) (decision to revoke state grant of parole).
, Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
Id. at 577.
, 95 S. Ct. at 742.
', Id. at 740.
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certainly not a courtroom, Goss requires only oral or written notice
of the grounds in support of the suspension. 3 If the student denies
the charges, he must be given an explanation of the damaging
evidence and an opportunity to explain his side of the story. Pre-
liminary notice and hearing may be waived by school officials if
an offending student's conduct endangers persons or property or
threatens to disrupt the academic process. In these instances, the
proper procedures should follow as soon after the suspension as
practicable. 4
As the Court pointed out, Goss provides little more than what
most school officials already furnish their students to insure en-
lightened and fair-minded disciplinary procedures. The full im-
pact of Goss, however, cuts much deeper than merely requiring
notice and hearing. The Court ruled only on suspensions of ten
days or less. In circumstances involving longer suspensions, perma-
nent expulsions, or short term suspensions involving "unusual sit-
uations," the Court intimated that more in the manner of proce-
dural due process may be required. Thus, as Mr. Justice Powell
points out, the Court has entered a "thicket.""7
The term "unusual situations" has the same indefinable qual-
ities as the infamous "special circumstances" rule of Betts v.
Brady.8 As Betts was judicially unworkable, so may be Goss. Pow-
H3 Id.
8, Id. By basing its decision on lower court holdings, the Supreme Court could
have required more than it did. For example, in Givens v. Poe, 346 F. Supp. 202
(W.D.N.C. 1972), students were found entitled to the right to examine adverse
evidence, cross-examine witnesses, present evidence, and have the proceedings be-
fore an impartial tribunal, in addition to notice and hearing.
95 S. Ct. at 740.
Id. at 741.
'7 Id. at 747.
316 U.S. 455 (1942), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
Betts held that in felony cases, states only need to provide assistance of counsel to
indigents in those cases involving special circumstances. Betts was much criticized.
As one writer commented:
The cases decided by the Court under the [Betts] formula are distin-
guished neither by the consistency of their results nor by the cogency of
their argument .... The rule, therefore, seems vulnerable to fundamen-
tal criticism, and so long as it persists, the law of the subject will remain
in a state of unstable equilibrium.
Allen, The Supreme Court, Federalism, And State Systems of Criminal Justice, 8
DEPAtK. L. REv. 213, 230-31 (1959). After years of frustration in determining which
factual situations constituted special circumstances, the Court erased the inconsis-
[Vol. 78
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ell enumerated certain non-disciplinary determinations which
could affect a student's future opportunities just as significantly
as a suspension. Among these are the grading systems used in
schools, the calculation of passing or failing, the qualifications for
promotion, and the system whereby students are classified into
groups according to estimated academic achievement. 8 As any one
of the above administrative decisions may directly impinge upon
the student's property and liberty interests, school officials may be
called upon in court to defend these everyday decisions, previously
made without fear of reprisal for errors in discretion.
Powell's fears may, however, not be justified. Although these
decisions will affect the student's education, they seem to involve
factors in which the courts would not want to embroil themselves.
Given that Goss was narrowly affirmed by a majority of five, a
great expansion of student protection would seem doubtful in the
near future.' " Also, while it may be argued that any adverse reac-
tion by the school to student performance or conduct could bring
about harmful consequences, it may also be true that the factors
Powell mentions are not within the scope of the due process clause.
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez9' held that
while states should strive for equality in education, perfect equal-
ity is not mandated because education was found not to be a fun-
damental right. Rodriguez legitimized discrepancies in the quality
of education received by students because, although certain stu-
dents received "less expensive educations" than others, the state
tencies in Gideon.
The difficulty with terms like "unusual situations" or "special circumstances"
is that they leave the determination and enforcement of what factors constitute
these tests up to the discretion of local judges and administrators. Thus, no single
constitutional standard can be enforced, appellate courts must sift through innu-
merable cases to decide if a special circumstance was overlooked, and broad rules
are reduced to confusing exceptions. The wisest policy would seem to be that once
a right is found to be constitutionally important, the procedures to implement this
right should also be mandated for all cases. E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966).
95 S. Ct. at 747-48.
'o "Some modicum of discipline and order is essential if the educational func-
tion is to be performed. Events calling for discipline are frequent occurrences and
sometimes require immediate, effective action. Suspension is considered not only
to be a necessary tool to maintain order but a valuable educational device." 95 S.
Ct. at 739.
11 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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made sure that all students received some sort of an education."
While student classification is anathema to some educators,93 it is
an extensively used practice and meets the Rodriguez standard of
giving an education to all students-albeit a different and perhaps
less equal education than that given to their peers. It would seem
to follow, then, that the classification of students into, for example,
"vocational," "remedial," or "college-bound" groups does not
present a due process argument, but rather one governed by the
equal protection clause. Thus, if the decision can be supported by
standardized testing or other reliable data, these procedures
should not be ruled impermissible.
The process of evaluating a student's work by awarding a
grade for a specific level of achievement also seems unlikely to
present the type of situations in which a Goss hearing will be
required. This would seem to be true regardless of whether the
grade is used to determine passing or failing, scholastic advance-
ment, or even the termination of the student's right to pursue an
education. Goss requires a hearing because even if the school offi-
cial with the power to suspend was a witness to the student's
impropriety, an explanation by the student of previously unknown
facts could alter the school's decision as to whether or not to sus-
pend.15 Generally, a hearing is a necessity only in those instances
in which a factual dispute needs to be settled before the state can
take final action." Hence, it follows that if there are no facts in
dispute, a hearing to merely announce a result is extraneous and
constitutionally unnecessary. The giving of a grade is, in a sense,
a hearing in itself. Students realize from the beginning of their
academic careers that they are graded and that the grades are
recorded, compiled and utilized to determine membership in
clubs, societies, and more significantly, entrance to institutions of
higher learning. This knowledge can favorably be compared to the
notice requirements of the due process clause. The hearing follow-
ing this notice would be the factors that go into making up the final
Id. at 28-29.
See generally, D. FADER. THE NAKED CHILDREN (1971); J. HOLT, How CHIL-
DREN FAIL. (1964); C. SILBERMAN, CRISIS IN THE CLASSROOM (1970).
" See, Note, Equal Protection and Intelligence Classifications, 26 STAN. L.
REv. 647 (1974).
, 95 S. Ct. at 739.
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grade such as testing or written assignments. If the school main-
tains a constant grading scale, then all that need be done is to
apply the evaluation scale to the student's work to determine the
final grade. Theoretically, the application of the scale should be a
ministerial rather than a discretionary decision. For example, a
student scoring seventy-five per cent on a test should receive the
same grade regardless of who applies the scale. Since this is a
ministerial decision it is doubtful that the awarding of grades cre-
ates a situation requiring a due process adjudication."
Problems could arise, though, if, even after the tests and pap-
ers are graded, a discretionary choice remains, that is, if the
teacher could consider factors other than those announced in
reaching the final grade. Again, however, a hearing seems to be
unnecessary. The courts do not and need not require perfection in
administrative decisions.98 Thus, the burden will be on the student
to declare and prove an arbitrary application of the facts to the
grading scale. Whether or not this ultimate decision will require a
hearing will probably depend on whether the student can allege
some sort of special circumstance. Seemingly, though, in recogni-
1, An analogy can be drawn to instances in which states revoke drivers' licenses
after the driver has accumulated a sufficient level of penalty points, e.g., Stauffer
v. Weedlun, 188 Neb. 105, 195 N.W. 2d 218 (1972), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 972
(1972). In Stauffer, the Nebraska court distinguished Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535
(1971). Bell held that states could not revoke licenses on the grounds of lack of
financial responsibility if they require fault as a prerequisite because Georgia re-
quired fault as a prerequisite to having to post a security bond. Fault, of course, is
a factual problem that can only be decided in an adversary hearing. Stauffer held
that Nebraska's Department of Motor Vehicles need not conduct a hearing prior
to license revocation when the only question to be answered was the number of
penalty points received by the driver:
In a very real sense the Director acts only ministerially. The result-the
revocation-flows from the operation of the statute upon the already
judicially determined facts, that is, the series of convictions of traffic
offenses. Of these the motorist already has knowledge. Of their effect
point-wise he is charged by law with knowledge just as with any other
case of knowledge of the law. These circumstances do, in our opinion,
make the procedures applicable to revocation of a driver's license for an
accumulation of points for traffic offense conviction clearly distinguisha-
ble from revocation under the financial responsibility law as in Bell v.
Burson. . ..
188 Neb. at 112, 195 N.W.2d at 223.
11 Cf. O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., 340 U.S. 504 (1951); Universal
Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951). The "substantial evidence" require-
ment for judicial approval of administrative action is clearly a less than perfect
system for weighing evidence.
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tion of the academic and judicial burden that would accumulate
if every failing grade required court approval, it seems unlikely
that the grading process will be found to require adversarial hear-
ings.
Goss is aimed solely at disciplinary removals from school and
not at student classification or the determination of the quality of
education the student is to receive. While arguments will certainly
be made in an attempt to expand Goss, the Goss holding will most
likely be limited to disciplinary decisions.
An "unusual situation" justifying trial-like procedures in sus-
pension cases could involve complex factual situations, fellow-
students as the sole adverse witnesses or staunch denials of all
charges by the supposed offender. While these examples will pose
difficult determinations, of greater judicial significance will be
those instances in which disciplinary decisions are challenged as
being offensive to the constitutional rights of the students. Wood
v. Strickland"0 held that school board members may be liable
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for any invasion of a student's constitu-
tional rights. The key question left unanswered by Goss and Wood
is perhaps the most important: exactly what are the constitutional
rights of public school students?
The lower courts are in complete disarray over this question.
Save possibly for certain first amendment guarantees,' 0 there is no
unanimous stand on either side of any question involving student's
rights. Students would seem to be damaged most significantly by
violations of either their fourth' 0' or eighth amendment'2 freedoms.
" 95 S. Ct. 992 (1975).
'® See notes 47 to 60 and accompanying text infra.
"' U.S. Const. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
People v. Overton 24 N.Y.2d 522, 249 N.E.2d 366. 301 N.Y.S.2d 479 (1969), is an
example of what courts have generally done with students' fourth amendment
rights. See notes 35 to 40 and accompanying text supra. See generally, Buss, The
Fourth Amendment and Searches of Students in Public Schools, 59 IOWA L. REV.
739 (1974).
The problem of unconstitutional searches in public schools is significant in that
not only may they lead to disciplinary sanction, but they often entail criminal
(Vol. 78
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In each instance when these freedoms have been adjudicated, the
courts have weighed the students' interest against the necessity of
maintaining order and discipline in the schools, and in all but a
few cases, students have lost."3 Few courts will be willing to grant
proceedings. To the West Virginia courts, fourth amendment questions may prove
to be an unusually important problem. As a response to Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct.
729 (1975), the West Virginia Board of Education, on July 11, 1975, published a
handbook entitled "Rights and Responsibilities of Public School Students in West
Virginia." This pamphlet sets forth the full spectrum of what the student may
expect from his teachers and principals during his academic career. On the whole,
the book grants students full constitutional protection and should pass judicial
scrutiny. However, the handbook maintains that at times school officials are em-
powered to conduct warrantless searches without the consent of the student. West
Virginia Board of Education, Rights and Responsibilities of Public School Students
in West Virginia, § VIII, at 12 (1975).
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503
(1969), held that students are "persons" under the first amendment. See note 57
and accompanying text infra. It would seem reasonable that "persons" under the
first amendment could be found to be "people" under the fourth amendment.
Hence, the searches permitted by the Board of Education seem susceptible to
judicial review.
'1 U.S. Const. amend. VIII provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
On October 20, 1975, the United States Supreme Court affirmed, without
opinion, Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294 (M.D.N.C. 1975), in effect holding that
corporal punishment is not violative of the eighth amendment. Baker v. Owen, 96
S. Ct. 210 (1975). Baker argued that as "the custody, care and nurture of the child
reside first in the parents," Prince v. Massachusetts 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944), the
right to determine disciplinary methods for school students is primarily an issue
for parents. As such, it is a fundamental right, and the state must therefore show a
compelling interest in order to punish students against the wishes of their parents.
395 F. Supp. at 298-99.
The district court disagreed. The state need not demonstrate a compelling
justification to paddle students, since parental rights are not implicitly guaranteed
by the Constitution. Thus, the school need provide only a "legitimate state end"
to punish students, 395 F. Supp. at 299-300. "So long as the force used is reasonable
• . . school officials are free to employ corporal punishment. . . until in the exer-
cise of their own professional judgment, or in response to concerted pressure from
opposing parents, they decide that its harm outweighs its utility." 395 F. Supp. at
301.
But as the court noted, in light of Goss v. Lopez, corporal punishment may not
be inflicted unless the student has been afforded prior notice and hearing. 395 F.
Supp. at 302.
See also, Bramlet v. Wilson, 495 F.2d 714 (8th Cir. 1974), wherein 42 U.S.C. §
1983 was found to be a proper vehicle to challenge the excessive use of corporal
punishment.
"I For fourth amendment decisions concerned with public school students,
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students all the rights of adults, but Goss and Wood at least sug-
gest that students in our public schools are citizens under the
Constitution and, as citizens, deserve recognition of their freedom
to learn in an atmosphere less burdened by restrictive and consti-
tutionally suspect policies.
While the initial impact of Goss v. Lopez will not greatly
overburden the public school systems, its recognition of "unusual
situations" may have repercussions as resounding as the death of
"separate but equal" in Brown v. Board of Education.'4 Brown
recognized the significance of the equal protection clause in public
education. Goss, in finding the due process clause applicable to the
public schools, has completed a full circle around the fourteenth
amendment. Goss will not be the end, but rather the beginning of
the children's crusade for full constitutional recognition.
John B. Koch
compare, In re C., 26 Cal. App. 3d 320, 102 Cal. Rptr. 682 (1972); State v. Baccino,
282 A.2d 869 (Del. Super. 1971); State v. Stein, 203 Kan. 638, 456 P.2d 1 (1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 947 (1970); and Mercer v. State, 450 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1970), with People v. Bowers, 72 Misc. 2d 800, 339 N.Y.S.2d 783 (Crim. Ct.
1973); and People v. Jackson, 65 Misc. 2d 909, 319 N.Y.S.2d 731 (App. Term 1971),
aff'd, 30 N.Y.2d 734, 284 N.E.2d 153, 333 N.Y.S.2d 167 (1972)(dissenting opinion).
Baker v. Owen, 96 S. Ct. 210 (1975), will, of course, have a significant impact
on future corporal punishment cases. For prior rulings, compare Glaser v. Marietta,
351 F. Supp. 555 (W.D. Pa. 1972) and Suits v. Glover, 260 Ala. 449, 71 So.2d 49
(1954), with Sims v. Board of Ed. of Independent School Dist. No. 22, 329 F. Supp.
678 (D.N.M. 1971) and Ware v. Estes, 328 F. Supp. 657 (N.D. Tex. 1971), af'd per
curiam, 458 F.2d 1360 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1027 (1972). See Note,
A Chance to Whip Corporal Punishment: Eighth Amendment Applied to Corporal
Punishment in the Schools-Bramlet v. Wilson, 495 F.2d 714 (8th Cir. 1974), 7
CONN. L. REv. 116 (1974).
,0, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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